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 1 
MODELLING THE IMPACT OF COMPULSORY FMD INSURANCE 
Abstract 
This paper compares two ways of financing the combating of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in the 
EU and uses a simulation model to determine the welfare and production implications of the two sys-
tems. The two systems analysed are (i) financing by the tax payers, resembling the system currently in 
place, and (ii) a compulsory insurance scheme where all costs are converted into regionally differenti-
ated insurance premiums that are paid by the producers. The analysis indicates that welfare gains may 
be realised by shifting from the former to the latter financing system. 
Keywords: Foot and mouth disease, insurance scheme 
JEL classification: D61, Q18. 
1.  Introduction 
In this paper, we compare two ways of financing the combating of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in 
the EU and use a simulation model to determine the welfare and production implications of the two 
systems. The two systems analysed are (i) a purely tax financed system, where all costs for preventive 
measures and combating of FMD outbreaks are financed by the member state governments and partly 
reimbursed by the EU, and (ii) a compulsory insurance scheme where all costs are converted into re-
gionally differentiated insurance premiums that are paid by the producers. 
The first of the analysed systems represents a stylised version of the policy that is presently ap-
plied in the EU. There is a common policy for combating infectious animal diseases and the measures 
applied follow, since 1992, a stamping out strategy with culling and disposal of infected livestock and 
the preventive killing of animals that have been in contact with infected herds or were on contiguous 
farms. Under the present policy, national governments bear almost all the costs connected to the out-
break. Part of those costs is reimbursed from the EU budget providing that certain measures are taken 
to control the outbreak. In the analysis we disregard, for the sake of simplicity, that some insurance 
schemes are already running in different member states and assume that the entire cost is carried by 
national governments and the EU. This simplification can be justified by the fact that national insur-
ance schemes are of minor importance so far. 
The second system is analysed to explore an alternative to the present policy. The choice of this 
particular option can be motivated as follows. Although government involvement in the eradication of 
an infectious disease can be justified on efficiency grounds, because freedom from infectious diseases 
is a public good, the same does not apply to the government responsibility for financing the eradica-
tion policy. The present system implies that manageable risks are not reflected in the cost of produc-
tion. The result is that too much risky production is generated and the allocation of production be-
tween regions and countries is affected as well. Howe and Whittaker (1997) have argued that the pre-
sent policy acts as a free insurance of last resort. In addition, the fact that a part of the eradication costs 
is reimbursed from the EU budget creates a substantial redistribution between Member States as risk 
for outbreak varies considerably among them.  
Liability assignment could constitute an alternative option for financing eradication. However, 
this solution is not suitable in the case of FMD ⎯ causation is not always clear and the liable party 
may not be able to pay the damages. Private first-party insurance could be an alternative to liabilities 
but as uninsured farmers would otherwise lack the incentive to limit the disease, only compulsory 
insurance would be efficient. As insurance companies show little interest in sectors where basic statis-
tical data is not available an exigency fund seems to be a possible option. Such a fund would in reality 
operate as a compulsory insurance scheme. A Veterinary Fund already exists in the EU. However, it is 
not a fund in the proper sense of the word, merely a line in the EU budget. The total spending on 
eradication of infectious diseases has vastly exceeded allocated means. Accordingly, this paper will 
analyse some implications of an introduction of a compulsory insurance scheme assuming that the full 
cost of eradication is included in the insurance premium, i.e. paid by the producer. It should be pointed 
out, however, that the question of what is the best way to design alternative risk financing instruments 
for covering the costs of eradication of epizootic diseases is a very complicated one, and this paper 2 
does not aspire to resolve it. The ambition is only to illustrate implications of one particular option that 
can be deemed reasonable. For more discussion see for instance Asseldonk, et al. (2003). 
This paper has four sections: In the first section, we describe the scenarios analysed, and the as-
sumptions underlying the analysis are carefully explained. In the following section, a brief overview of 
relevant parts of the CAPRI modelling system is given. In the third section, the results of the model-
ling exercise are presented, and in the last section we conclude with some policy implications. 
2.  Background for constructing the scenarios 
In order to explore the implications of the compulsory insurance scheme, one must first establish the 
premiums. In a usual insurance system such premiums depend on past events. In fact, one of the im-
portant conditions for insurability of risk is the availability of reliable information on the probability 
and the magnitude of future outbreaks. However, lack of sufficient data and the fact that the FMD 
situation world-wide has deteriorated significantly during recent years (Ryan, 2001), making historical 
data even less reliable predictors of the future, imply that calculations of the premium cannot be based 
on statistically sound grounds. Instead, a hypothetical case has been developed in co-operation with 
experts  on veterinary medicine, based on the experiences from the analysis carried out in Ds 2002:31. 
Based on the costs of eradication in this scenario, see below for details, the insurance premiums were 
calculated for Sweden. The premiums in all regions in the EU were, subsequently, based on the cost 
estimates for Sweden modified with respect to risk, see below. 
The study (Ds 2002:31) assumed one outbreak of the disease per 30 years, each affecting 500 av-
erage size farms, or equivalently, 1% of the livestock being affected every 30 years. That assumption 
was arrived at after consulting veterinarian experts, i.e. people with knowledge and understanding of 
current and future probabilities, at the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the Swedish National Veteri-
nary Institute (SVA). The cost per animal included full repayment to the farmer of the value of culled 
animals and reimbursement of business interruption costs.Government costs included costs for de-
struction of the animals and disinfecting facilities. The costs for other sectors (slaughterhouses, trad-
ers, and tourist facilities) were assumed to be 30% of the direct cost for agriculture. The costs were 
annualised using an interest rate of 4%. Table 2.1 shows the annual cost for FMD outbreaks in Sweden 
resulting from the assumptions above. Those costs were used as a basis for computing the costs for 
FMD in all regions of the EU. 
As a comparison, Blake, Sinclair and Sugiyarto (2001) compute the costs of the outbreak in the 
UK 2001, and find that the direct and indirect impact on tourism is significantly larger than the impact 
on agriculture and food trade taken together. Thompson et al. (2002) also compute the costs of the UK 
outbreak, and arrive at similar numbers, although they compute a somewhat smaller impact on the 
tourism sector than Blake, Sinclair and Sugiyarto. However, the outbreak in 2001 was one of the larg-
est recorded (Blake, Sinclair and Sugiyarto), and it seems reasonable that smaller outbreaks have more 
than proportionally less impact on tourism. In addition, both studies cited above note that expenditure 
and resources lost from agriculture and tourism will be used elsewhere, thus reducing the impact. 
Blake, Sinclair and Sugiyarto use a CGE model to quantify that effect.  
Table 2.1: Assumed annual costs for FMD in Sweden 
Animal kind  Annual cost per head (EUR) 
Dairy cows  1.23 
Heifers, bulls and steers  0.80 
Calves 0.39 
Suckler cows  0.83 
Sows 0.36 
Pigs for fattening  0.17 
Ewes and goats  0.26 
Source: DS 2002:31 and veterinary expertise constructing scenarios for the EU level 
The specific features of the FMD disease can provide some guidance for constructing scenarios at the 
EU level. FMD is an epizootic, an acute infectious viral animal disease. The virus is present in several 
varieties and it affects most animals in agricultural production, such as cattle, pigs and sheep. Airborne 
spread of the disease can occur and the animals can also pick up the virus from direct contact as well 
as from contaminated foodstuffs used as feed. The magnitude of an outbreak is influenced by a num-3 
ber of factors. The most important are livestock density, what kind of animals gets the infection first, 
the transport of animals and the movement of people in the area, the breeding method, climatic condi-
tions (moisture, wind) and the delay between outbreak and measures taken. The determining factor in 
limiting the outbreak is prompt identification and an effective surveillance program. In this study we 
only consider stocking density, because regionalised data on average stocking densities is readily 
available, and it is a factor that can be influenced by producers. Moreover, if a common compulsory 
insurance scheme were to be introduced, it would have to be based on easily available data. There is 
no precise information or knowledge at the EU level about how livestock density affects the magni-
tude and the distribution of the FMD. Although more detailed studies at micro-level are available, 
more complex relationships cannot easily be used for an approximation of the relationship between 
risk and a single parameter. Hence, the calculations are based on alternative assumptions and should 
merely be seen as an illustration of the effects of different risk scenarios.  
To probe the range of possible effects of introducing compulsory FMD insurance for livestock, 
five scenarios were constructed. In all scenarios premiums depend on stocking density in order to cap-
ture the impact of density on the probability of spread. The scenarios differ with respect to assump-
tions about spreading of infection and infection probability. All the scenarios share the assumptions 
that spreading of the disease depends only on stocking density, and that the composition of the herd 
(different kinds of animals) does not influence the spreading. It is well known that different kinds of 
animals do have a different impact on how the disease is spread. If available, more detailed informa-
tion on such relationships could easily be incorporated in the calculations. Furthermore, it was as-
sumed that each animal should bear its own cost, i.e. costs of eradication of the disease are not pooled 
between different livestock categories but covered within each category. This implies that the pre-
mium is lower for a pig than for a dairy cow. 
The scenarios can be inscribed in a two-by-two matrix (table 2.2), where the rows represent dif-
ferent assumptions about how infection spreads and the columns different assumptions about infection 
probability. How insurance premiums were adjusted depending on assumptions is discussed in detail 
below the table.  
Table 2.2. Simulated scenarios 
 
Probability of infection 
is 1% of the herd 
every 30 years in 
Sweden 
Probability of infection 
is 1% of the herd 
every 30 years in the 
EU 
Premium depends 
linearly on stocking 
density 
FMD1 FMD3 




Premium is identical 




As argued above, stocking density affects the spread of the disease. Unfortunately, no data is available 
to estimate the dependence of the spread of the disease on stocking density. Instead, three different 
forms of functional relationships were used, all based on the quadratic form 
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where the premium p for animal kind i in region r depends on stocking density q and the three parame-
ters a, b and c. The stocking density q is the total number of FMD-susceptible animals per square 
kilometre of land in region r, i.e. it is animal density, not herd density. This is a rather flexible defini-
tion that could be used to approximate, within a limited range, also other functional forms. As we base 
all scenarios on the cost for Sweden in (Ds 2002:31), we only have a single piece of information, suf-
ficient for determining only one of the parameters. It would indeed be desirable to obtain some infor-
mation also on how the cost changes when stocking density changes. 4 
Three different functions used were obtained by using, in turn, each of the parameters alone, thus 
obtaining for (a>0, b=c=0) a constant premium, identical in all regions, for (b>0, a=c=0) a premium 
that depends linearly on stocking density with intercept zero, and for (c>0, a=b=0) a premium that 
depends only on the squared stocking density. These relationships can be motivated for example by 
assuming that the probability that a new infection starts is the same for all animals, and then varying 
the principles for spreading this new infection to surrounding farms.  
The simplest possibility is that the premium is the same in all regions as in FMD5. This could be 
the case if the disease is spread from each infected animal to a constant number of other animals re-
gardless of the number of animals in the region (e.g. every animal would have to pay for its own de-
struction/replacement and for 100 “neighbouring animals”). This is not a very realistic representation 
of how the disease spreads, as the number of farms affected would depend also on stocking density. 
The next more complex (from a mathematical point of view) possibility is linear dependence, 
arising for example when a circle is drawn around the infected farm and the radius of the circle does 
not depend on stocking density. Then the number of animals within the circle, affected by measures, 
will be proportional to stocking density, as will the cost per animal. 
Yet another possibility is that by drawing a circle around an infected farm, enclosing all animals 
to be destroyed or quarantined, the area of that circle is proportional to stocking density. In this case, 
the number of animals in the area, and hence the cost per animal, will depend on the square stocking 
density. That could be a reasonable case if we imagine that the spreading velocity of the disease de-
pends on stocking density. It is easy to think of good reasons for cubic and exponential forms as well, 
by assuming that the radius of the circle depends linearly (or some higher order of expression) on 
stocking density, for example by the hypothesis that the number of transports to and from farms in the 
area is an important means of spreading the disease, and that the number of transports is proportional 
to stocking density. Due to the limited space and limited empirical information, we limit the study to 
the quadratic form given above. 
As pointed out above, the probability of infection, i.e. the frequency by which FMD outbreaks 
occur (columns in table 2.2), was a second parameter that was varied while constructing the scenarios. 
The following two assumptions were considered: (1) the expert judgement that 1% of the animals are 
infected every 30 years applies only to Sweden on average, and (2) the judgement applies to the entire 
EU. Those two assumptions do, in combination with the different spreading functions, imply very 
different annual costs for FMD, because most Swedish regions have a stocking density below EU av-
erage. 
Assumption (1) is actually the assumption that each year each animal kind i in Sweden on aver-
age costs ki Euro per head and year, with the amounts ki corresponding to the numbers in table 2.1. 
Now, this amount has to equal the sum of premium payments in all Swedish regions divided by the 
total number of animals of that kind in Sweden. With the notation introduced above, letting xri be the 
number of animals of kind i in region r, this is written  
  ∑ ∑ =
r ri r ri ri i x x p k       (r∈SE) (2) 
The sums are taken over the set of all regions in Sweden (r∈SE). If the expression for pri, according to 
equation (1) is substituted into equation (2), the non-zero parameter (a, b or c, respectively) can be 
solved for in each of the functional relationships that have been described above. Inserting this pa-
rameter back into equation (1) enables calculation of the value of the premium in different regions. 
This procedure can be repeated with assumption (2) by taking the sums over all regions in the EU 
instead of regions in Sweden only. This gives different values for ki and as a result different levels of 
premiums. 
In the case where the functional relationship only contains the constant a, assumptions (1) and (2) 
are equivalent. In contrast, if the function is linear (b>0) the average premiums per head in the EU 
under assumption (2) will be exactly those in table 2.1, whereas they will be about seven times higher 
under assumption (1), when the numbers in table 2.1 are assumed to hold for Sweden. This is because 
the average stocking density is seven times higher in the EU than in Sweden. If we use only the quad-
ratic term in the function for p, i.e. (c>0), the average premium per animal in the EU will also be pre-
cisely the amounts in table 2.1 under assumption (2), but under assumption (1) they will be very much 5 
higher (the average will instead hold for Sweden). In the latter case, a few densely stocked regions in 
the EU pay the major share of the sum of premiums in the EU. The regional premium amounts are 
presented in somewhat greater detail in the next section. 
Figure 1 illustrates the principle behind the premium calculations. Point A is stocking density in 
Sweden and cost per animal from DS 2002:31, B is average EU stocking density and cost per animal 
from DS 2002:31, C is the cost per animal in Asseldonk et al (2003) plotted to the stocking density in 
the relevant regions of the Netherlands (source CAPRI). Scenario FMD1 was constructed by comput-
ing the straight line from the origin through A, FMD2 by fitting a quadratic function with only one 
parameter to run through the origin and A (thus yielding an extremely high premium at a stocking 
density as in some Dutch regions), FMD3 by fitting a straight line through the origin and B, FMD4 by 
fitting a quadratic function of only one parameter to the origin and B, and finally FMD5 by choosing 
the constant function that runs through A (and B). One can easily conceive of functions involving 
more parameters, like the dashed line in the figure. However, too little data is available to estimate 
such a function, and hence the analysis is carried out for illustrative examples of premium functions. 
With increasing experience of factors influencing risk, more detailed criteria can be used. The figure is 
not to scale. 
 
Figure 1: Computation of insurance premium as a function of stocking densities in the scenarios. 
Each of the five scenarios was implemented for the model base year, which is the average of 2000, 
2001 and 2002, and as the model is comparative static, the results can be roughly interpreted as an-
swering the question “what would have been the situation in 2001 if a compulsory insurance program 
had been in place?” Each scenario is compared to a reference scenario, which is simply the base year 
where the taxpayers have to pay the insurance premium instead of the producer. As the model is a 
partial one, this does not influence the model solution, but only the welfare analysis of the results. 
It should be kept in mind that because we use a different set of assumptions about how the risk 
depends upon certain measurable parameters, the cost for FMD in the reference scenario will be dif-
ferent for each insurance scenario analysed. Accordingly, there is no common reference scenario but 
each insurance scenario is compared with a reference scenario of its own. 
3.  Regional distribution of animals and premiums 
The regional premium amounts are endogenous to the model in the sense that if the number of animals 
in a region is reduced, the density is reduced and consequently the premium is reduced (except for 
FMD5). The adjustment of the premium amount is done by iteratively changing the premium and solv-
ing the model. In that way, the premium amount is considered fixed in the economic optimisation 
problem of the producer. Hence, the final premium amounts could also be considered as model results. 
Anyway, we choose to present them in this section, and leave the results section for the presentation of 
effects on welfare, financing and production. 
Map 1 shows the stocking density at the regional level in Europe in the reference scenario. The 
darker the colour, the higher the stocking density. The highest densities are found in Noord-Brabant in 
the Netherlands, with more than 2000 animals per square kilometre on average, whereas in many re-
gions, white on the map, the density is less than one. In the GINI diagram on the left hand side of the 
map, the regions are ordered from the lowest density (left) to the highest, with a bar whose height and 
colour are proportional to density. The strongly convex shape of the upper contour in the GINI dia-


















Map 1. Stocking densities of the EU in the base year. 
Table 2.3 shows how the premium amounts for different animal kinds vary in the scenarios. Obvi-
ously, the second scenario leads to prohibitive insurance costs in a few regions, and rather high aver-
age costs. In the other scenarios, though, the average EU premiums are not very high, at least not 
compared to the direct payments that apply in many cases (suckler cows, bulls and steers, and slaugh-
ter premiums). A small number of regions have significantly higher risks with this risk model. 
Table 2.3: Premium amounts (costs for FMD). The first number is the lowest premium in any region, 
the number in the middle is the EU average, and the right is the highest value in any region. Amounts 
in EUR/head per year. 
Animal kind  FMD1:  FMD2  FMD3:  FMD4: 
Dairy cows  0 ≤ 8 ≤ 72  0 ≤ 75 ≤ 2346  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 11  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 35 
Heifers, bulls and steers  2 ≤ 5 ≤ 44  0 ≤ 27 ≤ 1389  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 8  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 26 
Calves  1 ≤ 3 ≤ 21  0 ≤ 15 ≤ 651  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 315  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 9 
Suckler cows  2 ≤ 3 ≤ 36  0 ≤ 10 ≤ 978  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 11  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 50 
Sows  1 ≤ 3 ≤ 13  0 ≤ 23 ≤ 322  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 2  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 3 
Pigs for fattening  0 ≤ 1 ≤ 6  0 ≤ 8 ≤ 149  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 1  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 1 
Ewes and goats  1 ≤ 1 ≤ 17  0 ≤ 3 ≤ 610  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 4  0 ≤ 0 ≤ 32 
Source: Own calculations and simulations with CAPRI. 7 
The following two maps illustrate the premium distributions. In scenario 5, the distribution is trivial 
(flat), so this map is omitted. Furthermore, the choice of risk level, i.e. the difference between scenario 
1 and 3 and between 2 and 4 is only a matter of scaling, and as the colours of the maps are automati-
cally fitted to the span of the data, the map for scenario 1 would be identical to that of scenario 3, and 
that of scenario 2 would be identical to that of scenario 4. Consequently, the maps for 1 and 2 are 
omitted. The premium amounts are different for different animal species. In order to reduce the num-
ber of maps to print, distributional maps for dairy cow premiums are used as examples, and the reader 
is referred to relations of table 2.1 to get an idea of the distribution of the premiums for the other ani-
mal kinds. 
 
Map 2. Distribution of the insurance premium for dairy cows in scenario 3. Numbers in euro cents. 
In the GINI diagram of map 2, showing the spatial distributions of the insurance premiums for dairy 
cows in scenario 3, it can be seen that in a few regions, the premiums are much higher than average. 
Those regions have darker colour on the map. In most regions in scenario 3, the insurance premium 
will be much less than one euro per animal and year, and in the most densely stocked region, Noord 
Brabant, it will be about 11 Euro per head. In scenario 1, where the premium function is calibrated to a 
certain infection frequency for Sweden, the premiums are about seven times higher in all regions than 
in scenario 3, which still is not very much money in any region except for the regions with the highest 
stocking densities (about 72 euro per dairy cow in Noord-Brabant, see also table 2.3). As the premium 8 
is proportional to stocking density in this scenario, the difference in premiums is a direct effect of the 
fact that in some few regions, husbandry is very intensive in terms of animals per land area. 
The distribution of premiums over regions is much more askew when stocking densities enter the 
risk function with their square, as in scenarios 2 and 4. This is evident in map 3. A relation of 1:2000 
regarding stocking density translates into a 1:4000000 relation in premiums if only the quadratic term 
is considered. In those scenarios, then, a few densely stocked regions are responsible for the major 
share of the costs for FMD. In Noord Brabant, the premium per dairy cow amounts to about 35 euro 
per head and year in scenario 4, whereas it is close to zero in almost all other regions. In scenario 2, 
where the square risk function is calibrated to the assumption that 1% of the animals in Sweden are 
infected every 30 years, this implies prohibitive risk premiums in the most densely stocked regions, 
with insurance premiums of more than 2000 euro per dairy cow.  
 
Map 3. Distribution of the insurance premium in scenario 4. Numbers in euro cents. 
It would be very useful to assess the soundness of calculated levels of premiums by comparing with 
other studies. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any such studies at the EU level. Assseldonk et al 
(2003) conduct Monte Carlo based simulations for the Netherlands subdivided into two regions. It 
seems (after minor recalculations) that the level of premiums the authors arrive at for milk cows is 
EUR 5.50 for the region with lower livestock density and  EUR 56 for the region with higher density. 
The latter figure is in the same order of magnitude as our figure of  EUR 70 in FMD1. It should be 9 
noted that our model contains more than two regions in the Netherlands. The region in our model with 
EUR 70 per head is the most densely stocked sub-region of the region for which Asseldonk et al. im-
pliy a cost of  EUR 56 per head. Thence, FMD1 is the scenario that best fits the Swedish (DS 2002:31) 
and Dutch (Asseldonk et al. 2003) studies, and should be regarded as the main scenario, with the other 
scenarios serving as sensitivity analyses. FMD2 is not very plausible, because in a few regions the 
premiums are high enough to replace all animals each year, and in FMD3 and FMD4, the premiums 
are far lower than the costs suggested by the two studies cited above. 
4.  The CAPRI modelling system 
The introduction of a compulsory FMD insurance was analysed using the CAPRI modelling system. 
CAPRI is being developed at the Institute for Agricultural Policy, Sociology and Market Research at 
the University of Bonn, Germany. Most of the material in this paper is based on the overview in 
Wieck et al. (2004). However, as the system is constantly evolving, some new material has been 
added. An extensive documentation can be found in Britz 2004, and on the website of the CAPSTRAT 
project. The CAPRI modelling system is designed as a projection and simulation tool for the agricul-
tural sector of the EU based on: 
•  A physical consistency framework, building upon balances for agricultural area, young ani-
mals and feed requirements for animals as well as nutrient requirements for crops, realised as 
constraints in the regional supply models. The market model ensures closed fat and protein 
balances for processed dairy products. 
•  Economic accounting principles according to the definition of the Economic Accounts for 
Agriculture (EAA). The model covers all outputs and inputs included in the national EAAs, 
with revenues and costs broken down consistently to regions and production activities. 
•  A detailed policy description. The regional supply models capture all relevant payment 
schemes with their respective ceilings as well as set-aside obligations and sales quotas. The 
market side covers tariffs, TRQs, intervention purchases and subsidised exports. 
•  Behavioural functions and allocation steering are strictly in line with micro-economic theory. 
Functional forms are chosen to be globally well behaved, allowing for a consistent welfare 
analysis. 
The model distinguishes a supply and a market module, which are iteratively coupled. The supply 
module consists of about 200 aggregate quadratic programming models at NUTS 2 level, working 
with exogenous prices during each iteration (NUTS is a system of administrative regions used by Eu-
rostat, the official statistics agency of the EU. NUTS 0 is the member states of the union, and NUTS 1, 
2, 3 and so on represent regionalisations of finer geographical resolution). After being solved, the re-
sults of these NUTS 2 models – crop areas, herd sizes, input/output coefficients etc. – are aggregated 
into Member State level models, which are then calibrated to these results by using techniques bor-
rowed from Positive Mathematical Programming (see Heckelei and Wolff 2003 for a critical review). 
Next, prices on young animals are determined by linking these Member State models into a non-
spatial EU model with market balances for young animals. Afterwards, supply and feed demand func-
tions of the market module are calibrated to the results from the supply module. Solving the market 
model delivers producer prices at Member State level, which drive the next iteration. Equally, in be-
tween iterations, premiums for activities are adjusted if ceilings are overshot according to the rules laid 
down in the Common Market Organisations. At this point, the FMD insurance premiums are also re-
calculated to reflect stocking densities in the last iteration. The recomputed insurance and CAP premi-
ums enter the supply model in the next iteration as a shift in the gross margin of the production activi-
ties. 
The market module breaks down the world into 12 country aggregates and the EU Member 
States, each featuring systems of supply, human consumption, feed and processing functions. The 
world market aggregates are EU, East European Candidate Countries, Mediterranean countries, U.S., 
Canada, Australia & New Zealand, Free Trade Developing Countries, High Tariff Traders (like Ja-
pan), India, China, ACP countries, Rest of the World. The parameters of the functions are derived 
from elasticity’s of other studies and modelling systems, and calibrated to projected quantities and 
prices in the simulation year, where the choice of the functional form (normalised quadratic for feed 
and supply, Generalised Leontief Expenditure function for human consumption) and further restric-
tions (homogeneity of degree zero in prices, symmetry, correct curvature) ensure regularity. Accord-10 
ingly, the demand system allows for the calculation of welfare changes for the consumers. The proc-
essing stage of dairy products for the EU Member states comprises balancing equations for fat and 
protein ensuring that processed products use up exactly the amount of fat and protein comprised in the 
raw milk. Production of processed dairy products is then driven by the difference between the dairy 
product’s market price and the value of its fat and protein content, based on a normalised quadratic 
profit function. Lastly, prices of raw milk are equal to its fat and protein content valued with fat and 
protein prices. 
Policy instruments in the market module include bilateral tariffs (ad-valorem and specific), Pro-
ducer/Consumer Support Estimate price wedges (PSE/CSE) and important bilateral agreements as 
well as globally or bilaterally allocated tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the EU and the 12 country aggre-
gates. Additionally, intervention sales and subsidised exports under World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
commitment restrictions are explicitly modelled for the EU. 
The Armington assumption, i.e. that imported and domestically produced goods are imperfect 
substitutes (e.g. Armington 1969), drives the composition of demand from domestic sales and the dif-
ferent import origins depending on price relations and thus determines bilateral trade flows. The 
model comprises a two-stage Armington system: the top level determines the composition of total 
demand from imports and domestic sales, the lower stage the import shares from different origins. 
Product markets are hence directly linked by import flows and prices, where observed in the base year. 
Accordingly, no uniform world market price is found in the system. In the current analysis, the top 
stage substitution elasticities for meat were all set to 4.0 except beef where it was set to 2.0, and the 
lower stage substitution elasticities were set to 6.0. This implies that most products are good substi-
tutes regardless of origin, but that imports from different sources outside the EU are more perfect sub-
stitutes to one another than are imports in general to domestic products. Products from different 
sources within the EU are considered perfect substitutes. 
5.  Results 
Though the premiums differ strongly between scenarios, there is very little effect on production except 
in scenario 2, where production is all but wiped out in some Dutch regions. Even in scenario 4, pro-
duction is seriously affected only in West-Flaandern and Noord-Brabant in the Netherlands, where the 
sheep and goat insurance premium of about 30 euro causes a strong decrease of 65 and 34 percent, 
respectively, in those animals, and where the number of suckler cows is reduced by about 6% in re-
sponse to an insurance premium of 47 and 50 euro per head, respectively. Note that the insurance 
premiums for suckler cows could be compared to the direct payments from the common agricultural 
policy of about 150 and 80 euro per head, respectively, for those regions. Qualitatively the model 
slightly reduces production compared to the reference scenarios where the premiums are high. Total 
animal production decreases, which in turn causes the prices of the outputs to rise, and those of inter-
mediate inputs like fodder (including cereals) to fall. In fact, the rising output prices counteract the 
cost of the insurance premium, so that in some regions with low premiums, production may even in-
crease. 
An overview of herd size changes between scenarios is given in table 5.1 below. In that table it 
can be seen that the decrease is precisely 90% for several animal kinds in the second scenario. That 
means that the model has run into a technical bound. The results for those regions are thus almost use-
less, indicating that the model is unsuited to simulate insurance premiums of 1000 euro and more. 
Furthermore, the results show that in all scenarios except scenario 2, the total effect in the EU is small, 
always less than 0.5%. This indicates that if stocking density really is a major determinant of infection 
risk, then a small number of regions, mainly in the Netherlands and Belgium, are likely to be affected 
by an insurance policy. 
The most interesting effects can be observed in the welfare analysis. Even though the quantitative 
effects on production are small in all scenarios, the principle that the one causing the costs pays the 
costs results in reallocation among the Member States. Currently, the costs of an outbreak of FMD are 
paid partly by the Member State and partly by the EU. In the simulations, it has been assumed that the 
member state pays 40% of the costs with the remaining 60% being paid from the EU budget. Member 
States have been assumed to contribute to the EU budget in proportion to their Gross National Income. 
Member States with low stocking density currently pay a larger share of the total EU costs for FMD 
than what is actually caused by the producers in that country, whereas the opposite is true for regions 11 
with high stocking densities. Introducing the compulsory insurance also provides incentives to reduce 
the total costs for FMD. In the simulations this is only possible by reallocating production. In reality, 
on-farm management practices are strongly influencing the risk of infection and spreading of the dis-
ease, letting us assume that the potential reduction of the FMD risk is greater than the modelling re-
sults indicate. Introducing the compulsory insurance indirectly shifts the burden of the costs from tax-
payers to producers. The reduction of the tax burden that results in the model if the cost for the insur-
ance scheme is shifted from the taxpayer to the producer is shown in table 5.2. 
Table 5.1: Herd sizes in scenarios compared to reference scenario, per cent. The first number denotes 
largest decrease in any region, the mid number is EU average change, the last is the largest increase in 
herd size in any region. 
Animal  kind  FMD1 FMD2 FMD3 FMD4 FMD5 
Dairy cows  -2 < 0 < 1  -70 < 0 < 9  -0.5 < 0 < 0  -1 < 0 < 0  0 < 0 < 0 
Heifers, bulls and 
steers  -4 < 0 < 2  -90 < 0 < 9  -1 < 0 < 1  -4 < 0 < 1  0 < 0 < 1 
Calves  -4 < 0 < 1*  -90 < -1 < 33  -1 < 0 < 2  -3 < 0 < 3  -1 < 0 < 1 
Suckler cows  -5 < 0 < 0  -80 < -2 < 4  -1 < 0 < 0  -6 < 0 < 0  0 < 0 < 0 
Sows  -3 < 0 < 4  -70 < -3 < 5  0 < 0 < 0*  -1 < 0 < 0  0 < 0 < 0 
Pigs for fattening  -5 < 0 < 1  -90 < -4 < 10  -1 < 0 < 1  -1 < 0 < 1  0 < 0 < 0 
Ewes and goats  -35 < 0 < 3  -90 < 0 < 14  -8 < 0 < 0  -65 < 0 < 3  0 < 0 < 0 
Source: Simulations with CAPRI 
Table 5.2. Taxes saved with compulsory insurance compared to completely tax financed FMD com-
bating. Million euro per year. 
  FMD1 FMD2 FMD3 FMD4 FMD5 
EU  total  768  7941 121 119 121 
Belgium & Lux.  49  832  7  12  4 
Denmark  37  316 5 4 4 
Germany  162  1491 25 22 27 
Austria  15  130 2 2 3 
Netherlands  95  1748 14 24  7 
France  125  1117 20 17 22 
Portugal  10  77 2 1 2 
Spain 62  455  10  8  13 
Greece  12  90 2 2 3 
Italy  78  697 12 11 15 
Ireland  17  85 3 2 3 
Finland  7  73 1 1 2 
Sweden  13  132 2 2 3 
UK  86  696 15 12 15 
Source: Simulations with CAPRI 
Budget outlays in the model consist, apart from the cost for combating FMD, mainly of direct pay-
ments, export subsidies and intervention purchases. Those other costs of the common agricultural pol-
icy (CAP) remain largely unchanged in all the scenarios, because production is very little influenced 
and because most direct payments have ceilings that stabilise the total amount paid even when produc-
tion fluctuates. Therefore, the changes in tax burden reported in table 5.2 are almost completely due to 
the changed financing of FMD combating. The numbers in the table are the differences between tax 
payer cost in each insurance scenario and the corresponding reference scenario. In the reference sce-
narios, tax payer costs for each country are computed as 40% of the expected cost of FMD outbreaks 
plus the country’s share (computed as GDP shares) of the EU budget, including 60% of the expected 
cost of FMD in all EU countries. In the insurance scenarios, it is only the country’s share of the total 
cost for CAP measures in the EU, whereas the insurance is paid by the producers. Thus, the tax saving 
depends to 40% on the expected cost of FMD in the country and to 60% of the size of the economy. It 
can be seen that member states with the highest tax payer costs are the larger Member States: Ger-
many, France, Italy and the UK, as well as the Member States with high stocking densities: the Neth-
erlands and Belgium. 
Furthermore, we see that the stronger the risk is assumed to depend on the stocking density, the 
higher the costs of FMD in densely stocked member states turn out. This is especially obvious if the 12 
cost of FMD in the Netherlands is compared between scenarios 3, 4 and 5. In scenario 5, where the 
premium does not depend on stocking density at all, the annual cost for FMD is seven million Euro. If 
a linear relationship is assumed, then the annual cost turns out to be twice as high, or 14 million Euro, 
and if the quadratic relationship is assumed, the cost is 24 million Euro per year. For a member state 
with lower average stocking density, the converse is observed. Note that in scenarios 3, 4 and 5 the 
premium function was set up so that the total cost for the EU was the same in all three scenarios, so 
the effects just mentioned are pure redistributions between member states. The reader may object that 
the total tax saving for the EU turns out lower in scenario 4 than in scenarios 3 and 5. This is due to 
changes in agricultural production in scenario 4, when the premiums are rather high for some animal 
kinds (see table 2.3). 
In most cases, agricultural income is reduced when the cost for combating FMD is shifted to the 
industry. Calculations of the change in income are shown in table 5.3. However, agricultural income 
does not decrease in all member states in all scenarios, but in some cases there are actually minor in-
come increases. That is because the increased cost leads to slightly higher prices, and in regions with 
low stocking densities – and therefore low premiums – those price rises are sufficient to offset the 
negative effect of the premium. Of course, this effect can only occur if the premium depends in some 
way on stocking density, and is stronger in the quadratic scenarios 2 and 4. 
Table 5.3. Change of agricultural income* with compulsory insurance compared to completely tax 
financed FMD combating. Million euro per year. Negative number = loss of income. 
  FMD1 FMD2 FMD3 FMD4 FMD5 
EU  total  -419 -556 -120 -124 -111 
Belgium  &  Lux.  -64  -434 -11 -21  -3 
Danmark  -51  -268 -9 -6 -5 
Germany  -50  221 -17 -12 -20 
Austria  3  114 0 1  -2 
Netherlands  -151  -1616 -23 -47  -6 
France  -49  108 -24 -23 -22 
Portugal  -3  59 -3 -2 -4 
Spain  -24  485 -19 -11 -26 
Greece  -8  66 -7 -6 -8 
Italy  22  451 -2 -2 -2 
Ireland  -15  42 -4 -1 -5 
Finland  2  45 -1 -1 -2 
Sweden  4  82 0 0  -2 
UK -33  91  -1  6  -3 
*  Gross value added plus direct payments minus insurance premiums. 
If the taxpayers’ gains in table 5.2 are compared to the producer losses in table 5.3, it is clear that in 
the scenarios 3, 4 and 5, where the premiums are low, the insurance is merely a redistribution of 
money between taxpayers and producers. All taxpayers in the EU together save about 120 million euro 
and the producers lose about the same amount in all three scenarios. It is important to notice that even 
if there is no dependence of the risk upon animal stocking density, as in scenario 5, the shift of respon-
sibility for the costs from taxpayers to producers alone is enough to cause some redistribution between 
member states. 
In scenarios 1 and 2, where the premium amounts are much higher, the incentive to shift animals 
to regions with lower premiums is strong and leads to a cost saving. This manifests itself in tables 5.2 
and 5.3 in that the taxpayers gain more than the producers lose when the insurance is introduced. In 
the extreme (and implausible) scenario 2, with high costs and a square risk function, this has a radical 
effect: The taxpayers save almost eight billion euro, while the producers lose only 556 million. That 
perhaps surprisingly small producer loss is due to the price effect: Animal output prices rise signifi-
cantly, and the inputs gets significantly cheaper. That also implies strong effects on the consumption 
side, where the higher meat prices induce a welfare loss for consumers that is not offset by lower 
prices for crop outputs, and also losses for the processing industries when processed volumes are re-
duced. In the other scenarios, production is little influenced, so price changes are in the range of less 
than plus or minus one percent. 13 
If agricultural income, money metric for consumers and processing industry profits are added and 
tax payer costs subtracted, a measure of overall welfare is obtained. Table 5.4 shows the difference in 
that measure between the insurance and the reference scenarios. In each scenario, there is an overall 
welfare gain, although small. In scenarios 3, 4 and 5 it is 37, 38 and 26 million euro per year respec-
tively. Only in the quite extreme scenario 2, the difference to reference is significant, 3.4 billion euro. 
Only Denmark and the Netherlands lose overall welfare in that scenario. More interesting is the redis-
tribution between Member States, which in some cases is greater than the overall welfare change. 
Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Finland, Sweden and the UK show net welfare gains in all scenarios, 
whereas Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece and Ireland lose in all scenarios except in scenario 2. For 
the three remaining member states Belgium (with Luxembourg), Portugal and Spain, the net effect 
depends on the choice of functional form for the risk function. 
Table 5.4. Welfare* gain with compulsory insurance compared to completely tax financed FMD com-
bating. Million euro per year. 
  FMD1 FMD2 FMD3 FMD4 FMD5 
EU  total  28  3357 37 38 26 
Belgium  &  Lux.  -24  172 -2 -8  2 
Denmark  -21  -24 -3 -2 -1 
Germany  52  824 20 24 15 
Austria  9  150 2 2 0 
Netherlands  -69 -68  -8 -22  2 
France  29  580 10 13  6 
Portugal -1  34  -1  0  -1 
Spain -6  407  -5  1  -11 
Greece  -6  60 -3 -2 -4 
Italy  42  590 12 14  8 
Ireland  -3  90 -2 -1 -3 
Finland  6  78 1 1 0 
Sweden  11  133 3 3 1 
UK  9  331 14 17 12 
*  Welfare is defined as money metric for consumers plus agricultural income plus processing industry profits minus taxpayer outlays. 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper aims at comparing the impact of a hypothetical compulsory insurance scheme where the 
premiums are related to some of the manageable risks in production (stocking density and number of 
animals) with the present EU policy. Impact on production, welfare and distribution between regions 
and member states is analysed under different risk scenarios. 
According to the analysis in the paper, introduction of the compulsory insurance scheme would 
improve social welfare, as the most risky production would decrease or reallocate to regions with 
lower risks (lower density). This result is consistent with economic theory. Our analysis has ignored 
the transaction costs involved in collecting premiums (or levies). If such costs are significant, the wel-
fare gain will be reduced.  
The impact is, in general, quite small but it should be observed that we analyse only one disease. 
It does not make much sense to limit compulsory insurance to one disease. Other infectious diseases 
(e.g. swine fever) with risks related to stocking density should be covered by such a scheme if applied. 
In such a case, the impact would be larger. However, even when only one disease is analysed, the im-
pact on the most affected regions, i.e. those with highest livestock density, is not negligible. The most 
significant impact of the insurance scheme would be a substantial redistribution of welfare and budg-
etary flows between the Member States, from member states with high stocking densities like the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, to large countries with lower stocking densities like Germany, 
France and Italy. 
There are major uncertainties involved in estimating the total annual cost of FMD. However, our 
results are not critically dependent on the correct level of the total costs, as the objective is to analyse 
welfare gains stemming from a system that distributes the costs in relation to the livestock density.  14 
The analysis in this paper is based on very simplified assumptions and the results, accordingly, 
should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, we believe that the results are solid enough to contribute 
to the discussion on how the future policy for eradication of infectious diseases should be formulated, 
in particular how costs should be paid. The alternative risk-financing instrument explored in this paper 
would, if introduced, result in a welfare gain. This could constitute an argument for a reform. How-
ever, in order for the gains to materialise, the premiums need to be correctly related to the risk factors. 
The results of model experiments indicate that the welfare gains are strongly dependent on how risks 
are connected to production. Our analysis does not aspire to have provided a reliable way of making 
the connection rather it indicates a strong need for further research in this area.   
Such a further research seems, furthermore, motivated by the fact that the risk of outbreaks of in-
fectious livestock diseases is likely to increase in the future, especially in view of the recent and up-
coming enlargements of the EU.  
The alternative risk financing instrument explored in this paper implied that the producer paid the 
full cost of eradication of FMD. Such an alternative is efficient if the producer is the only one who can 
manage risks connected to the disease, or if he/she is the one who can avoid them at the lowest cost. 
Producers can do a lot to affect the risk. By the choice of the location of the production but also by 
conduct on the farm, producers are able to mitigate the risk. However, the cost of the outbreak also 
depends strongly on the conduct of the public authorities in the member states where the outbreak 
takes place. Prompt identification and an effective surveillance program are crucial for limiting the 
number of animals that have to be culled. However, the present system, where a large part of the costs 
is paid by a common budget is not efficient as it limits incentives both for farmers and for national 
governments to apply costly precautionary measures.  
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